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Background/Aims: Possible fatal complications arising from coronary angiog-
raphy (CAG), percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI), and coronary artery dis-
ease itself, are likely to cause medical disputes. Presenting the current status and 
reasons for judgments given in lawsuits related to CAG/PCI, this study aimed to 
identify ways to prevent unnecessary disputes and medical malpractice suits re-
lated to CAG/PCI through lawsuit analysis. 
Methods: A total of 13 cases (20 judgments) found in the Supreme Court of Korea’s 
Written Judgment Management System from 1998 to 2017 were analyzed.
Results: Coronary artery injury was the most common causative complication 
that led to lawsuits (n = 6, 46%). Six cases (46%) were ruled in favor of the plaintiff 
for violation of duty of care (n = 4) and duty of explanation (n = 2), respectively. 
Cases that violated duty of care included two errors in intra-procedure device ma-
nipulation, one in pre-procedure diagnosis, and one in management of post-pro-
cedure complication. Lack of explanation regarding the risk of complications was 
pointed out in both cases that violated duty of explanation. The average awarded 
amount for the damages was 114,436,064 Korean won.
Conclusions: Physicians need not fear unfair judgments so long as they follow 
standard of care because the Court consistently looked at the probability, the fore-
seeability, and the evidence. Therefore, maintaining standard of care is import-
ant. Besides, specific, detailed, and comprehensible explanations, including the 
risk of complications in addition to the necessity of procedures, are important to 
ensure the patient clearly understands the possible risk of adverse outcomes.
Keywords: Coronary angiography; Percutaneous coronary intervention; Malpractice; 
Dissent and disputes; Jurisprudence
Prevention of medical malpractice and disputes 
through analysis of lawsuits related to coronary 
angiography and intervention
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INTRODUCTION
With the right to self-determination becoming import-
ant in recent times, patients are asked to actively par-
ticipate in the decision-making process for treatment. 
Although advancements in information and communi-
cation technology has led to a greater dissemination of 
medical information easier, insufficient doctor-patient 
communication and a negative view of the public re-
garding the authority of doctors have created a feeling 
of distrust toward doctors. Hence, many medical acci-
dents are attributed to doctor negligence (action or lack 
of action during a medical procedure that leads to ill-
ness, disability, or death) by the general population and 
2 www.kjim.org https://doi.org/10.3904/kjim.2018.365
The Korean Journal of Internal Medicine. 2019 Jun 14. [Epub ahead of print]
lead to medical disputes [1,2].
Coronary artery disease is one of the leading causes 
of death worldwide [3-5]. Since decades of medical ad-
vancement, coronary angiography (CAG) and percuta-
neous coronary intervention (PCI) have remained the 
mainstay treatments for coronary artery disease. As the 
complexity of the procedure increases to include broad-
er indications of chronic total occlusion, calcified coro-
nary disease, and cardiogenic shock [6], the likelihood 
of complications related to the procedure may increase 
despite the contribution of the procedures to better 
prognosis. 
In Korea, more than 50,000 patients receive PCI an-
nually. The number of patients increased by 8% during 
the period 2011 to 2015 and shows a steadily increasing 
trend. Correspondingly, with 178 centers in 2015, there 
was an increase of 17% in the number of centers capa-
ble of performing PCI from 2011 [7]. Since medical dis-
putes related to CAG and PCI may well increase in the 
future, interventional cardiologists may not be able to 
completely avoid medical disputes during their careers. 
However, there has been no previous research on ac-
tual disputes related to CAG/PCI in Korea. In this paper, 
the current status in relation to such disputes is pre-
sented, and the reasons for admitted or dismissed faults 
was analyzed with actual lawsuits. Furthermore, we tried 
to identify ways to prevent unnecessary disputes and 
medical malpractice suits.
METHODS
Judgments were collected from the databases of the 
Supreme Court of Korea’s Written Judgment Manage-
ment System and each court’s service, which provides 
copies of the judgment to any subscriber [8]. Malprac-
tice lawsuits involving CAG/PCI were included in this 
study, based on judgments entered from January 1998 
to December 2017. A total of 78 lawsuit judgments were 
obtained with the search terms “coronary angiography,” 
“coronary stent,” “percutaneous coronary intervention,” 
and “compensatory damage in medical practice.” Dupli-
cate cases, or those where CAG/PCI was only mentioned 
(but not a main issue of the lawsuit) were excluded. In 
total, 13 cases with 20 judgments were classified as judg-
ments related to medical accidents in which CAG and 
intervention were disputed procedures.
From the descriptions of the judgments, information 
on the age, sex, type of defendant institution, claimed 
amounts, disputed complications, and severity of injury 
were collected. Direct mention of the diagnosis was also 
given in some reports. Based on the presence of ST-seg-
ment elevation or the disease course mentioned (such 
as exertional or resting chest pain), the diagnoses were 
classified into stable angina, unstable angina, non-ST-
segment elevation myocardial infarction (NSTEMI), and 
ST-segment elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI). If 
there was no specific evidence of disease classification 
on the judgments, they were mentioned as unclassifi-
able angina or myocardial infarction (MI).
Information about lawsuit case number, year of the 
final judgment, and court process (from First instance 
to Appeal to Supreme Court in the three-level court 
system) was collected. Cases were classified based on 
whether the plaintiffs (who filed a formal complaint 
with the court) won or lost. In cases that ruled in favor 
of the plaintiff, details regarding the awarded (to give a 
judgment of money to a party to a lawsuit claim) dam-
ages—consolation money (compensation for mental 
suffering caused by an illegal act), limitation of liabili-
ty (a ruling that reduces someone’s legal responsibility 
for damages by %), lost earning capacity (a decrease in 
a person’s ability to earn income), expense of funeral, 
and expense of treatment—in Korean won (KRW) were 
collected and analyzed. 
In light of the fact that the physician’s legal obliga-
tions are mainly concerned with duty of care (legal ob-
ligation to take reasonable care to avoid causing dam-
age) and duty of explanation (legal obligation to explain 
procedure from civil law), the reasons for plaintiffs’ 
claims, indemnities (security or protection against a loss 
or damage), or dismissals for each duty were separately 
collected and analyzed. Reasons for each indemnity or 
dismissal were reviewed to learn from the results.
The content of each judgment was analyzed inde-
pendently by a cardiologist (C.W.H.) and a physician for 
medical law and ethics (S.H.S.). In the case of a conflict 
between the two authors, a review by a doctor of public 
health (W.L.) was conducted.
The study was conducted on the basis of a judgment 
published publicly in the database of Korean Supreme 
Court Judgment System. The courts have completed an-
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onymization in advance, making access to sensitive per-
sonal information impossible. Therefore, Institutional 
Review Board (IRB)  approval was not required.
RESULTS
General characteristics 
The general characteristics of the cases involved in this 
study are presented in Table 1. Among 13 patients, sev-
en (54%) were male. The sex of six patients (46%) was 
not identified. The number of patients aged below 60 
was three (23%), and above 60 was four (31%). The age 
of the other six patients (46%) was not identified. Re-
garding the type of defendant institution, six cases (46%) 
were from general hospitals and seven cases (54%) were 
from tertiary hospitals. According to the diagnoses, six 
patients (46%) had angina pectoris. 
Among the patients with angina pectoris, three (23%) 
had stable angina, two (15%) had unstable angina, and 
one (8%) had unclassifiable angina. Seven patients had 
MI (54%). Among the patients with MI, two (15%) had 
NSTEMI, three (23%) had STEMI, and two had unclas-
sifiable MI. 
The most common complication that caused the dis-
putes was coronary artery injury with six cases (46%), in-
cluding three cases (23%) of coronary perforation, two 
cases (15%) of coronary dissection, and one case (8%) of 
iatrogenic atheroma rupture. In relation to device fail-
ure, there was one case (8%) of stent thrombosis and one 
case (8%) of residual stent balloon after deflation failure. 
Disease-related complications included atrioventricular 
(AV) block, myocardial rupture, and suspected ventricu-
lar fibrillation or spasm, with one case each. 
The complications resulted in the death of 11 patients 
(85%), one patient had hypoxic brain damage, and an-
other patient had to undergo follow-up out-patient de-
partment care due to ischemic heart failure. A detailed 
summary of all the cases is listed in Table 2.
Trial outcome
Of the total 13 cases, seven (54%) were dismissed and 
the other six (46%) were ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 
Of the six awarded cases, four (31%) were recognized as 
violation of duty of care and the other two (16%) were 
recognized as violation of duty of explanation (Fig. 1A). 
Table 1. General characteristics of cases (n = 13)
Characteristic Number
Sex
Male 7
Female 0
Not identified 6
Age, yr
≤ 60 3
> 60 4
Not identified 6
Type of defendant institution
General hospital 6
Tertiary hospital 7
Diagnosis
Angina pectoris 6
Stable angina 3
Unstable angina 2
Unclassifiable 1
Myocardial infarction 7
NSTEMI 2
STEMI 3
Unclassifiable 2
Causative complication
Coronary artery injury 6
Perforation 3
Dissection 2
Iatrogenic atheroma rupture 1
Device failure 2
Stent thrombosis 1
Residue of stent balloon after deflation 
 failure
1
Disease-related complications 3
AV block 1
Myocardial rupture 1
Ventricular fibrillation or spasm 1
Miscellaneous complications 2
Hemothorax 1
Ruptured aortic dissection 1
Grave injury
Death 11
Hypoxic brain damage 1
Ischemic heart failure 1
NSTEMI, non-ST-segment elevation myocardial infarction; 
STEMI, ST-segment elevation myocardial infarction; AV, 
atrioventricular.
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No cases were recognized as a violation of both duties. 
Of the total 13 cases, seven (54%) were sentenced in the 
first instance, five (38%) during the appeal, and one (8%) 
in the Supreme Court (Fig. 1B). The average claimed 
amount was 205,653,242 KRW and the average awarded 
amount was 114,436,064 KRW (Fig. 1C). The awarded 
amount comprised lost earning capacity, funeral ex-
penses, treatment expenses, consolation money, and 
limitation of liability. Details of the awarded amounts 
are shown in Table 3.
Violation of duty of care
Four cases were ruled in favor of the plaintiff (from 13 
total cases that claimed violation of duty of care) (Table 
4). Of them, three were ruled as performance error and 
one as diagnostic error around the course of PCI. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the cases were titled accord-
ing to their date. In case no. 1, there was a no-reflow phe-
nomenon after stent deposition, and repetitive balloon 
dilatation was performed on the lesion of the coronary 
artery. Thereafter, coronary perforation occurred. Neg-
ligence was recognized because of perforation from re-
400,000,000
350,000,000
300,000,000
250,000,000
200,000,000
150,000,000
100,000,000
50,000,000
0
205,653,242
114,436,064
348,324,069
194,556,780
94,046,863
34,315,348
208,722,082
Claimed amounts
Trial outcome
Dismissal
7 (54%)
Violation of duty of care
4 (31%)
Violation of duty of 
explanation
2 (15%)
Violation of 
both duty
0 (0%)
Lawsuit progress
Awarded amounts
0
Not identified ageAge > 60Age ≤ 60Overall
Average of claimed and awarded amounts
(￦)
   High court
5 (38%)
Supreme
 court
1 (8%)
District court
7 (54%)
Figure 1. Judgment status. (A) Trial outcome. (B) Lawsuit progress. (C) Average of claimed and awarded amounts.
A
C
B
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peated balloon dilatation without identification of the 
cause of the no-reflow phenomenon, despite no high-
risk lesions, such as calcified or tortuous lesions, having 
been observed.
In case no. 3, revascularization, such as thrombolysis 
or PCI, was delayed for seven hours because of a mis-
diagnosis of acute MI based on the presence of Q wave 
on the electrocardiogram (ECG), leading to a diagnosis 
of recent MI. The court recognized the misdiagnosis 
based on the existence of ST-segment elevation on the 
ECG and the cardiac marker, with initial normal range, 
becoming elevated in a matter of hours. Therefore, the 
court determined that there had been negligence by 
the physician because there was a causal relationship 
between misdiagnosis, delays in revascularization, and 
death.
In case no. 6, negligence of inappropriate device ma-
nipulation was identified because of acute thrombotic 
occlusion caused by iatrogenic atheroma rupture with 
a device such as a guidewire or intravascular ultrasound 
(IVUS) catheter. Delayed revascularization by two ep-
isodes of guidewire distortions and guidewire also re-
peatedly stimulated myocardium and induced ventric-
ular fibrillation.
In case no. 11, Adams-Stokes syndrome (characterized 
by a decrease in cardiac output and loss of conscious-
ness due to a transient arrhythmia such as AV block or 
tachy-brady syndrome [9]) occurred from decreased ce-
rebral blood flow after AV block-induced bradycardia, 
resulting in cerebral infarction. The court ruled that 
although death itself is highly likely due to MI and car-
diogenic shock, there was a causal relationship between 
cerebral infarction, the fact that a temporary pacemaker 
should have been inserted, and, possibly, death. In the 
end, physician negligence was determined.
On the other contrary, nine cases with a total of 28 is-
sues related to violation of duty of care were dismissed 
(Table 5). Errors in management after complications and 
procedural skills were alleged by the plaintiffs in most 
of the dismissed cases.
The court pointed out that the plaintiff must prove 
the physician’s fault, such as by exhibiting a substan-
dard level of medical knowledge or skill or any violation 
of fiduciary duty. Thus, evidence should be presented to 
prove the physicians’ fault, but in most dismissed cases, 
there was insufficient or no evidence of malpractice. For Ta
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example, in a case in which the patient presented with 
sudden death three days after PCI, and aortic dissection 
rupture was confirmed after an autopsy, the plaintiff al-
leged the following: (1) aortic dissection may be misdi-
agnosed as unstable angina based on chest pain prior to 
the procedure and (2) aortic injury had occurred during 
the procedure based on the patient’s severe back pain 
after PCI. The court judged that the diagnosis of unsta-
ble angina was not a deviation from standard care, based 
on the stenosis of vessels on the CAG and the improved 
symptoms after PCI. There were no findings indicating 
aortic dissection, such as mediastinal widening around 
the procedure. In addition, the court recognized that se-
vere back pain, not a specific symptom for suspecting 
aortic dissection, may occur due to supine position on 
bed required to prevent bleeding after the procedure. 
Therefore, the possibility of aortic dissection around the 
PCI was not proven due to lack of evidence.
Claims based on nonspecific symptoms alone or oth-
er diseases showing lack of probability were dismissed. 
In a case with stent thrombosis, the plaintiff claimed 
Table 4. Plaintiff claims and reasons for indemnity in cases of violation of duty of care
Case no.
Final trial 
court
Fault Plaintiff claims Reasons for indemnity
1 Appeal Performance 
error
Fault of coronary perforation by 
error of device manipulation
No vulnerable precursor lesion of coronary perfo-
ration like severely calcified or tortuous lesion
Repetitive stent balloon dilatation without identifi-
cation of the cause of no-reflow phenomenon after 
stent deposition
3 First in-
stance
Diagnostic 
error
Misdiagnosis as recent MI rath-
er than acute MI based both on 
chest pain 1 week ago and pres-
ence of Q wave on ECG
Delayed reperfusion therapy such 
as thrombolysis or PCI at 7 hours 
after arrival at ER
Recognized misdiagnosis based on both the pres-
ence of S-T segment elevation on lead V1-V4 and 
steep elevation of follow-up cardiac marker from 
initial normal range
Delayed reperfusion therapy led to death
6 First in-
stance
Performance 
error
Fault of management failure and 
induction of ventricular fibrilla-
tion with error of device manipu-
lation
Recognized negligence of device manipulation be-
cause of acute thrombotic occlusion by iatrogenic 
atheroma rupture with device such as guidewire 
or IVUS catheter
Delayed revascularization by two episodes of 
guidewire distortion
Induced ventricular fibrillation and death by re-
petitive stimulus of guidewire
11 First in-
stance
Performance 
error
No temporary pacemaker on AV 
block resulted in aggravation of 
Adams-Stokes syndrome and 
cerebral infarction
Temporary pacemaker should have been inserted 
to manage AV block with decreased cerebral per-
fusion
MI, myocardial infarction; ECG, electrocardiogram; PCI, percutaneous coronary intervention; ER, emergency room; IVUS, 
intravascular ultrasound; AV, atrioventricular.
Table 5. Disputed claims of the plaintiffs in nine dismissed 
cases
Variable Number
Errors in management after complication 8
Errors in procedural skills 7
Errors in decision of therapeutic strategy 5
Failure to recognize complication  
after procedure
2
Fabricated evidence submitted 2
No prescribed antiplatelet agents 2
Errors in diagnosis 1
Errors in checking for defects of devices 1
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that there was delayed recognition of the complication 
despite the complaint of nonspecific chest discomfort. 
However, the court dismissed the claim because non-
specific chest discomfort frequently occurs after a PCI. 
In addition, as there were no signs of MI on the ECG, 
it was judged that a CAG was not urgent. In a case with 
hemothorax confirmed after cardiopulmonary resus-
citation (CPR), the plaintiff claimed that the hemotho-
rax was a procedure-related complication. However, 
the judge denied that there was a causal relationship, 
as hemothorax is not a common complication, and 
hypovolemic shock should have occurred immediate-
ly if the aorta had been injured during the procedure. 
Furthermore, the patient had no complaints until the 
next morning. In addition, the court commented that 
a proximate causal relationship between the physician’s 
negligence and the consequences, when there is a lack of 
probability, is not acceptable.
The court did not accept negligence only based on 
the fact that an adverse outcome had occurred. If com-
plications occurred despite the physician’s practice of 
medicine with a high standard of care, the court judged 
whether the given complication was outside of the gen-
erally accepted range based on the contents of the med-
ical practice and procedures, the site and degree of the 
complication, the standard level of medical care at that 
time, and the proficiency of the physician in charge. 
In contrast to a previous case of coronary perforation 
in which the plaintiff was partially awarded, the court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that perforation oc-
curred due to procedural error ruling that negligence 
is not recognized by that fact alone in two other cases of 
coronary perforation. In one of the two case, the court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that the unreasonably ex-
panded balloon led to the coronary artery perforation 
because contrast leakage was detected at the end of pro-
cedure, not immediately after the balloon dilatation. In 
the other case, the court recognized that there was no 
definitive evidence (such as the size, length, or pressure 
of the balloon, or inflation time, etc.) that the physi-
cian had violated the standard of care. In a case of stent 
thrombosis, the plaintiff claimed that it originated from 
the possibility of stent underexpansion. However, the 
court recognized that stent thrombosis is an unavoid-
able complication (with less than a 1% probability), and 
there is no way to expand the stent completely to contact 
the entire vessel area in the current level of medical care. 
The reasons provided were the size discrepancy of the 
proximal and distal reference vessels and the possibil-
ity of coronary dissection occurring when the balloon 
is inflated using higher pressure. Finally, the judge did 
not accept the allegation that disputed complications 
are beyond the range of general acceptance. In a case 
of deflation failure and residue of balloon in the vessel, 
the court dismissed the claim ruling that defects in the 
balloon itself could not be ruled out, and that there was 
no proof of the physician’s malpractice. Additionally, in 
both dismissed cases of coronary dissection, negligence 
was not determined based on lack of evidence during 
the physicians’ procedures.
Violation of duty of explanation
In nine of 13 cases, the plaintiffs insisted that the phy-
sicians had breached their duty of explanation. Two of 
those cases were admitted. In both cases, violations were 
recognized for the following reasons (Table 6). 
In case no. 5, there was a manual description that em-
phasized the necessity of the procedure, but no informa-
tion on the possibility of adverse outcomes. In case no. 
9, a specified description about coronary dissection was 
not given, and only the unspecified vascular complica-
tions were mentioned. Additionally, the fact that it was 
a non-emergency situation was pointed out to support 
the infringement of right to self-determination through 
lack of explanation. For reference, the consent form be-
ing signed on the day before the procedure was high-
lighted to support the violation of duty of explanation 
in the first instance but not commented on in appeal.
The judgments noted that there was no additional ex-
planation regarding details other than those printed in 
both cases. In general, to determine whether the situ-
ation was explained in detail, the court considered the 
presence of additional drawings such as circular mark-
ing or underlines on the printed contents, at least, as 
explanation.
In contrast, the other seven cases were dismissed for 
the following reasons. In four cases, from the evidence 
submitted, it was identified that sufficient informed 
consent was taken. In two cases, the plaintiffs claimed 
that the physician who explained the procedure was not 
the one who performed it. However, in both cases, the 
court ruled that the physician's performance itself was 
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not negligent. 
Lack of detailed explanations about unexpected crit-
ical consequences was claimed in one case, but it was 
dismissed because the scope of duty of explanation does 
not include explanations that are irrelevant to the pro-
cedure. As an example in case no. 2, the court recognized 
that the hemothorax that occurred after CPR was an ir-
relevant complication of the procedure considering the 
circumstances surrounding medical practice. 
Regarding the signing of the agreement, in one 
case, the plaintiff claimed that the wife had signed on 
the agreement, not the patient himself, and that was a 
breach of duty. However, the court dismissed this claim 
recognizing the circumstances wherein explanation was 
given to both the patient and his wife.
In another case, the plaintiff claimed that there was 
no explanation regarding the capacity of the healthcare 
provider and the entire system to cope with an emer-
gency if it did occur. The court ruled that an emergen-
cy could occur in any procedure, and in that case, the 
patient could be transported to a tertiary hospital, as a 
simple matter of common sense. In a situation wherein 
the plaintiff did not request further explanations about 
emergency handling, the court ruled that the extent of 
a physician’s explanation does not include a guarantee 
for the choice of selecting other hospitals by preemptive 
self-notification.
DISCUSSION
In this study, the authors analyzed lawsuit judgments 
related to CAG and PCI over the past 20 years to pres-
ent the status of disputes and the reasons for indemnity, 
and, in conclusion, to determine ways to prevent unnec-
essary disputes and medical malpractice suits.
Estimation of awarded amount for damage
There are substantial differences in the awarded 
amounts around the age of 60 because the court esti-
mates the loss of daily income from the time of death to 
the age when an income can still be maintained, and the 
court generally recognize the age 60 as limit for earning 
capacity. There is no definite legal evidence that 60 is 
the age limit. However, the full court of the Supreme 
Court made such a judgment in December 1989, it has 
been upheld by several other Supreme Court decisions 
since then [10].
Table 6. Plaintiff claims and reasons for indemnity in cases of violation of duty of explanation 
Case no.
Final trial 
court
Plaintiff claim: lack of informed consent Reasons for indemnity
5 Appeal Insuff icient explanation about the possibility 
of death from procedural complication due to 
myocardial infarction
No signs of additional detailed explanation except 
for the printed content about complications 
Handwritten content emphasized only the neces-
sity of procedure, not the possibility of adverse 
outcome 
9 Appeal No detailed explanation about the necessity and 
risk of repeated procedure, especially the risk of 
coronary dissection
Insufficient time to make decision because of 
explanation about the procedural contents and 
complications just one day before the procedure
No signs of additional detailed explanation ex-
cept for printed content with diff icult medical 
terms—recognized as insuff icient explanation 
regarding the necessity for the procedure
No specific mention about coronary dissection—
just the mention of unspecif ied complications 
regarding vessels—recognized as insufficient ex-
planation about the possible complications of the 
procedure
Insuff icient time given to make decision—the 
consent form written just one day before the pro-
cedure (pointed out in the first instance) despite 
it being a non-emergency procedure—supports 
the infringement of self-determination
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The limit of liability was set at 30% to 70%, at the dis-
cretion of the court, reflecting the necessity of the proce-
dure, patient factors, such as age, habits like smoking or 
drinking, high mortality rate of the disease, and whether 
other treatments except for negligence were performed 
well. Specific criteria for numerical determination re-
main unclear; however, the discretion of the court 
seems to be dominant, considering that the purpose of 
civil litigation is arbitration. The sum of the estimated 
lost earning capacity, expenses for the funeral, and treat-
ment are then estimated based on the limit of liability. 
When consolation money is added to the above sums, 
it gives the total awarded amount. In cases of violation 
of duty of explanation, the awarded amount was judged 
to include only the consolation money, because viola-
tion of duty of explanation is not the same as violation 
of duty of care, as it does not have a causal relationship 
with adverse patient outcomes. The standard consola-
tion money was set as 80,000,000 KRW in 2008, and it is 
still the current referenced standard. Final consolation 
money is judged at the discretion of the court in con-
sideration of circumstances such as negligence and oth-
er factors. Usually, consolation money does not exceed 
30,000,000 KRW when there is only violation of duty of 
explanation, even in exceptional cases [11].
However, amounts awarded in damages may increase 
as there are arguments saying that it is unreasonable to 
define 60 years as the limit of earning capacity, espe-
cially in the era of an aging society. In accordance with 
this trend, judgments using 65 years as the limit are in-
creasing [12]. In addition, the basic consolation money is 
likely to be increased. Since the levels were set 10 years 
ago, there are also some arguments that the standard is 
too old and needs to be revised.
Who should prove negligence?
Currently, the side that has the responsibility to prove 
negligence of a physician in malpractice suits is the 
plaintiff. However, it is difficult to prove a scientifical-
ly clear causal relationship in civil litigation. Therefore, 
the court allow the plaintiff to prove a fact that there was 
malpractice in the process of medical practice based on 
matters of common sense, and an indirect fact that no 
other factors except malpractice were responsible for 
the adverse outcome, in other words, the patient did not 
have such medical history that can cause the outcome. 
In this way, the court may recognize negligence of the 
physician, presuming the causal relationship between 
the medical practice and the adverse outcome, unless 
the physician proves that the outcome was resulted 
from an entirely different cause [13]. For instance, in case 
no. 1, causal relationship was admitted, demonstrating 
that there was no high-risk lesion such as a tortuous or 
calcified lesion. 
However, in the case of proving negligence through 
such an indirect fact, the likelihood that any adverse 
outcome could be caused by medical malpractice should 
be assumed. It is not allowed to require the physician to 
prove non-negligence if there is only a presumption of a 
vague causal relationship [14].
Regarding violation of duty of explanation, the plain-
tiff is also responsible for proving negligence in prin-
ciple. However, lack of explanation can be difficult to 
prove from the patient side, while physicians can doc-
ument and demonstrate fulfillment of duty of explana-
tion. Thus, the court has consistent precedents that the 
physician should prove there has been no negligence in 
duty of explanation [13].
Violation of duty of care 
In an occupation that involves managing the life, body, 
and health of people, a physician has the duty of care 
to the best to prevent the risk of specific symptoms or 
circumstances for a patient when performing medical 
practices such as physical examinations and treatment. 
Duty of care involves foreseeing adverse outcomes as 
well preventing those adverse outcomes. Criteria for de-
termining medical malpractice are generally based on 
the standard level of medical care generally practiced in 
current clinical medicine [13].
Regarding the duty to foresee adverse outcomes, fore-
seeability is judged by clinically proven and published 
evidence, and it is sufficient if there is a possibility that 
the occurrence of the risk depends on the given cir-
cumstances [15]. The case no. 3 may correspond to this 
situation. In spite of the elevation of ST segment, the 
physician failed to recognize urgency based on the pres-
ence of Q wave on ECG, misdiagnosed as prior infarc-
tion. In general, Q wave reflects damaged myocardium 
including a prior infarction. However, it may also reflect 
the delayed treatment of current infarction, which can-
not rule out the acute myocardial infarction. Therefore, 
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through accurate reading of ECG, physicians should not 
make a mistake and miss the appropriate time point for 
a myocardial infarction treatment [16].
However, no obligation can be imposed on a physician 
if there are no foreseeability of the adverse situations 
[15]. In each case of ruptured aortic dissection confirmed 
after autopsy and hemothorax confirmed after CPR, the 
claims of mistreatment were dismissed because there 
were no objective or suspicious clinical findings of the 
disease such as a specific symptom or laboratory or ra-
diologic evidence.
As for duty to avoid adverse outcomes, physicians have 
an obligation to avoid foreseen risks. However, violation 
of such duty was notable in the case no. 11. After PCI, the 
patient had neurologic symptoms due to persistent bra-
dycardia from AV block, but the physician did not insert 
a pacemaker and cerebral infarction occurred. If brady-
cardia, such as an AV block, is accompanied by hypo-
tension or an altered mental status, atropine is the first 
agent [17]. However, it is ineffective against an infra-Hi-
sian block [18], when other chronotropic agents such as 
dopamine or epinephrine may be helpful. Transcuta-
neous or transvenous pacing, such as with the use of a 
temporary pacemaker, should be considered if medica-
tions are not effective [17]. In the case, the judgment was 
determined that not inserting a pacemaker against the 
symptomatic AV block was negligent, of which actions 
to increase the heart rate were recognized as below the 
standard level.
In addition, there was a case with recognized neg-
ligence in the process of dealing with the no-reflow 
phenomenon. Generally, the cause of a no-reflow phe-
nomenon is likely multifactorial due to a combination 
of endothelial damage, platelet and fibrin embolization, 
vasospasm, and extracellular or intracellular tissue ede-
ma, ultimately leading to neutrophil plugs and platelet 
infiltration of myocardial tissue and microcirculation 
injuries [19]. At first, very selective and distal intracoro-
nary or intravenous vasodilator such as adenosine [20,21], 
nicorandil [22], nitroprusside, nicardipine, or verapamil 
[23,24] is tried. Otherwise, epinephrine may be helpful 
[25,26]. If the problem is associated with the thrombus, 
intravenous or intracoronary abciximab or thrombus 
aspiration may be helpful [27,28]. Nevertheless, if the 
acute closure continues, the exact underlying pathology 
should be determined using intravascular imaging [19]. 
However, the physician did not try to assess the cause of 
no-reflow phenomenon, but repeated ballooning, which 
resulted in coronary perforation and was recognized as 
negligence.
It is noteworthy that even if a risky situation could be 
made inevitably, it was recognized as negligence if re-
peated. In the case no. 6, the iatrogenic plaque rupture 
caused by guidewire or IVUS catheter and the addition-
al delayed revascularization by repetitive guidewire dis-
tortions were recognized as negligence by the physician 
due to repetitive failure in device manipulation. 
All medical practices imply some degree of risk. In 
some cases, the patient cannot avoid treatment, and so 
must take the risk. Therefore, a physician cannot always 
assume responsibility for an adverse outcome. In the 
previous dismissed cases, we have confirmed that negli-
gence was not determined based merely on the fact that 
adverse outcomes occurred; there was absence of objec-
tive evidence that the physician made a mistake or vio-
lated duty of care.
In conclusion, physicians do not need to excessively 
perform defensive medicine by reacting too sensitively 
to unavoidable situations that are objectively unpredict-
able and uncontrollable. Because the judgments consis-
tently showed that the court system had looked at the 
probability, the foreseeability, and the evidence. Accord-
ing to the judicial content of one of the past judgements 
cited in this study, negligence of the physician is not 
unconditionally recognized unless it goes beyond the 
reasonable range. Since the court has ruled whether the 
physician violated the standard of care based on the ad-
vice of medical associations or of a specialist at a tertiary 
hospital, physicians need not fear an unfair judgment 
so long as they follow the standard of care. Therefore, 
ECGs should be read carefully so that a necessary ur-
gent revascularization is not delayed. Also, regarding the 
procedure, physicians should maintain reasonability in 
the choice of inflation balloon or stent regarding its size, 
length, inflation time, and pressure. Considering that a 
potential complication may progress to become critical 
within a short time, physicians should react promptly 
to any early signal of complication. In addition, it is es-
sential for physicians to have in-depth knowledge of the 
various potential complications related to the procedure 
and be prepared to react in a structured approach [19]. 
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Violation of duty of explanation
Probable sequelae or side effects related to the sched-
uled procedures should be the object of explanation if it 
typically occurs related to the procedure or if it results 
in irreversible and critical damage. Duty of explanation 
cannot be exempted by the fact that the likelihood of 
such side effects occurring is rare. If a patient has not 
been given detailed information about the possible out-
comes, including the possibility of death, the physician 
has failed to fulfill his duty of explanation [29]. However, 
the contents of explanation should include relevant de-
tails focusing on the probable side effects of the invasive 
procedure, not around any medical processes. The con-
tents to be explained have been stipulated in medical 
law since 2017, as follows [30]:
1.  Diagnosis of the symptom which has occurred to or 
which might occur to the patient
2.  Necessity, methods, and details of the surgery, etc.
3.  The name of the physician, dentist or oriental med-
ical doctor who gives explanation to the patient, or 
the name of principal physician, dentist or oriental 
medical doctor who participates in the surgery, etc.
4.  Sequelae or side effects expected to occur typically 
following the surgery, etc.
5.  Matters to be observed by the patient before and af-
ter the surgery, etc. 
It has been pointed out several times that complica-
tions that can lead to fatal outcomes are not sufficient-
ly explained. Providing only a simple listing or printed 
contents with difficult medical terms does not cover the 
duty of explanation. Therefore, each specified compli-
cation should be explained in an understandable way 
with proper additional handwritten drawings (at least 
including circular markings or underlined material) on 
the printed contents.
In the case of an emergency, an exemption from duty 
of explanation is generally recognized [29]. In this pa-
per, there were three cases of STEMI. In two of the three 
STEMI cases, a violation of the duty of explanation 
was not even claimed. In the one exceptional case that 
did claim an insufficient explanation about PCI in the 
STEMI patient, PCI had been planned after thromboly-
sis, not as an emergency. For reference, in a case where 
the infringement of the right to self-determination was 
already recognized due to the insufficient explanation 
about the necessity for and the possible complications 
of the procedure despite being a non-emergency, there 
was commentary about the time that informed consent 
was received and whether the patient had enough time 
to consider the procedure.
Regarding the person in charge of the explanation, 
it is also possible that explanations could be given by a 
physician not assigned to the patient, unless there are 
special circumstances [29]. Accordingly, claims of neg-
ligence regarding the explanation provided by anoth-
er physician who did not participate in the procedure 
were dismissed as above. However, the names of the 
physician who explains and the one who participates in 
the procedure should be clarified in the informed con-
sent in accordance with the Medical Service Act [30]. It 
should be noted that medical assistants (such as nursing 
assistants or hospital clerks) who are not physicians are 
not allowed to perform physicians’ duty of explanation 
in the place of physicians [29].
A dispute could possibly be caused if the signature of 
informed consent is not made by the patient him/her-
self. In the enforcement ordinance of Medical Service 
Act, legal representatives can receive consent only when 
the patient lacks decision-making ability [30]. Therefore, 
physicians should explain the situation to the patient 
directly and the signature of informed consent should 
be given by the patient himself. If that is not possible, 
the reasons should be clarified.
In conclusion, given the lack of understanding of the 
potential for complications, patients and caregivers are 
not ready to accept possible complications, and that can 
lead to disputes. Thus, it is also necessary for physicians 
to provide enough information so patients and caregiv-
ers have a thorough understanding of the difficulty of 
avoiding the inevitable risk of adverse outcomes.
Limitations of this study 
This study is based only on the contents of lawsuits in 
which rulings were handed down. Thus, some of the 
patients’ clinical information was missing. Lack of ac-
cess to patients’ medical records is another limitation. 
It should also be noted that the determination of negli-
gence in the cases herein came from the judge’s perspec-
tive, not that of a professional physician. In addition, 
disputes can be resolved in other ways, like arbitration, 
not solely by litigation. Considering the relatively low 
incidence of critical adverse outcomes, the number of 
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disputed cases may be insufficient. Thus, the 13 cases 
we have found may not accurately reflect the entirety of 
such disputes. However, this paper is meaningful in that 
it is the first to systematically analyze disputes related 
to CAG and PCI based on lawsuit judgments in Korea. 
There has been no previous research on the specific top-
ic of CAG/PCI lawsuits and analysis of specific reasons 
for court decisions. Finally, we hope that analysis of pre-
vious experiences will have an effect in reducing unnec-
essary and medical malpractice suits.
KEY MESSAGE
1. The incidence of medical disputes and the 
award amounts for damage related to coronary 
angiography/percutaneous coronary interven-
tion may increase.
2. To reduce medical malpractice and disputes, 
caution with foresight, early recognition, and 
management of complications regarding stan-
dard of care are vital. 
3. Specific, detailed, and comprehensible explana-
tions, including the risk of complications, are 
also important.
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